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Abstract—In this paper we discuss how to construct a bar-
rier certificate for a control affine system subject to actuator
constraints and motivate this discussion by examining collision
avoidance for fixed-wing unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). In
particular, the theoretical development in this paper is used
to create a barrier certificate that ensures that two UAVs will
not collide for all future times assuming the vehicles start in
a safe starting configuration. We then extend this development
by discussing how to ensure that multiple safety constraints
are simultaneously satisfied in a decentralized manner (e.g.,
ensure robot distances are above some threshold for all pairwise
combinations of UAVs for all future times) while ensuring output
actuator commands are within specified limits. We validate
the theoretical developments of this paper in the simulator
SCRIMMAGE with a simulation of 20 UAVs that maintain safe
distances from each other even though their nominal paths would
otherwise cause a collision.
Index Terms—Barrier function, safety, multi-agent systems,
fixed-wing unmanned aerial vehicles.
I. INTRODUCTION
AS low-cost, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) find civil-ian uses, the low-altitude airspace is increasingly con-
gested, leading to large-scale UAV operation limitations in-
cluding concerns for privacy, the environment, national se-
curity, and safe-flight validation [1]. A key challenge for
safe-flight validation in congested environments is ensuring
collision avoidance while enabling vehicles to accomplish their
designed missions. Thus, in this paper we propose a decen-
tralized algorithm that minimally alters a vehicle’s nominal
control signal (designed, for example, to deliver goods or for
crop monitoring) while still ensuring safe operations.
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A variety of approaches to fixed-wing collision avoidance
have been proposed. Partially observable Markov decision
processes are used in [2], [3] to achieve safe flight distances.
The dynamic window approach, originally introduced in [4]
for static obstacles and adapted to moving obstacles in [5],
uses circular arcs for trajectories and limits the set of allowable
velocities to enable a quick optimization of the control input.
In [6], the authors develop a first-order look-ahead algorithm
that can be applied to vehicles with unicycle dynamics in a
decentralized way while guaranteeing that collisions amongst
k vehicles are avoided. Potential functions [7], [8] have also
been applied to fixed-wing collision avoidance, where it can
be shown that vehicles can safely avoid each other even when
their sensing range is limited. Similarly, [9] discusses how
to combine potential functions with trajectory goals into a
navigation function in order to provide criteria under which
collision avoidance can be guaranteed. Navigation functions
have also been combined with Model Predictive Control
(MPC) by making inter-agent distance requirements implicit
in the cost function [10]. MPC has additionally been applied
to UAV collision avoidance for vehicles with limited sensing
[11] and communication constraints [12]. While MPC provides
a flexible framework for distributed collision avoidance, its
limited horizon can make safety guarantees difficult. In a more
general case, the optimal control formulation in [13] allows
for collision avoidance guarantees, but it is computationally
intensive as it requires numerically solving the Hamilton-
Jacobi-Bellman equations over an infinite horizon.
A central idea of this paper is how to leverage evasive
maneuvers to guarantee safe operations. Trajectory generation
was analyzed in [14] where a nonlinear program is developed
to find a safe reference trajectory constructed from polynomi-
als. In [15] and [16], the authors discuss trajectory generation
using a RRT with dynamics constraints provided by dubins
paths and a waypoint generation algorithm, respectively.
Similar to evasive maneuvers, traffic rules [17], [18] are
a method for encoding hybrid behaviors that can include
collision avoidance trajectories. In [17], the authors show that
a two vehicle system with limited sensing range can avoid
collisions while reaching position goals. While in general
this may result in conservative behaviors, they demonstrate in
simulation that the decentralized algorithm continues to allow
vehicles to reach their target configuration while avoiding
collisions for as many as 70 vehicles.
Motivated by the importance of formal guarantees of colli-
sion avoidance that are computationally feasible and minimally
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2invasive we discuss in this paper how to apply barrier certifi-
cates (e.g., [19], [20]) to the UAV collision avoidance problem,
where the system is subject to actuator constraints, nonlinear
dynamics, and nonlinear safety constraints. Barrier certificates
provide guarantees that a system will stay safe (i.e., vehicles
will maintain safe distances from each other) for all future
times. Further, under some assumptions detailed in Section II,
barrier certificates can be formulated as a Quadratic Program
(QP) for fast online computation of safe control inputs [20].
Given such safety guarantees, barrier certificates have been
applied to a set of problems including collision avoidance for
autonomous agents ([21], [22]), bipedal robots ([23], [24]),
adaptive cruise control and lane following ([25], [20], [26],
[27]), and in mobile communication networks [28].
However, barrier certificates rely on being able to find a
function for safety set invariance to be guaranteed. For systems
like a fixed wing UAV with actuator constraints, nonlinear
dynamics, and nonlinear safety constraints, generating such a
function can be difficult. In this respect they are similar to
Lyapunov functions. They provide guarantees when a system
designer can find appropriate functions but they may be
difficult to construct.
Nevertheless, there are a variety of approaches to finding a
barrier certificate given a system and safety constraints. One
approach discussed for instance in ([25], [29], [19], [30]), uses
a sum of squares decomposition [31]. In this approach an
initially conservative estimate for a barrier certificate is found
and the associated safe set is iteratively enlarged. Iterative
approaches have also been developed when the system has
relative degree greater than one. The conditions for calculating
a safe control input for higher order systems are given in [32].
In [24], a backstepping approach is developed that ensures
a control barrier certificate can be constructed and a similar
approach is discussed in [33]. In both cases, the barrier
function construction requires that the control input is not
subject to actuator constraints.
System-specific arguments have also been applied to the
development of a barrier certificate. For instance, geometric
insights are exploited in [23], where the authors develop a
barrier function for precise foot placement by ensuring that
foot is within the intersection of two circles. Similarly, in
[21], [22], the authors develop a barrier function that ensures
a circle and ellipsoid, respectively, around each robot will
not overlap in order to ensure there will be no collisions for
double integrator and quadrotor robots, respectively. Barrier
certificates have also been developed for unicycle dynamics
in [27], where the dynamics are simplified by considering a
point slightly in front of the vehicle.
This paper is concerned with ensuring that fixed-wing UAVs
maintain safe distances from each other. Because collision
avoidance can be viewed as a constraint for each pairwise
combination of vehicles [28], [34], we briefly review how
barrier certificates have been applied to systems with multiple
constraints. A contract-based approach is presented in [25].
A sum of squares decomposition is presented in [30] where
additional safety constraints map to additional constraints in
the optimization problem. In [33], necessary and sufficient
conditions are given for the existence of a control input
that satisfies multiple barrier certificate constraints. The ap-
proach generalizes to high order and time-varying systems
but requires that actuator constraints be unbounded. Barrier
certificate composition has also been addressed in [25], [28],
and [34]. In [25], the authors partition the state space into
regions for which a single barrier certificate is active in each
component of the partition. In [28] and [34] non-smooth
barrier functions are discussed, where the result allows for
combining barrier certificates using boolean primitives. One
drawback of the boolean composition approaches is that it is
not guaranteed that the composition of barrier functions will
result in a barrier function.
This paper makes the following contributions. First, it
generalizes a method discussed for instance in [21], [22]
for constructing a barrier certificate that can be used to
make safety guarantees for a system. Second, it shows how
to ensure that multiple safety constraints can be satisfied
simultaneously when using this constructive method. Third,
it presents a decentralized algorithm for ensuring safety in the
context of multi-agent systems. Fourth, it shows how to apply
the above theory to a scenario involving fixed wing UAVs
where vehicles must ensure minimum separation distances are
maintained at all times. This paper expands on the conference
version [35] which did not consider multiple constraints and
only considered the centralized case. It also expands on the
simulation study presented in [35] by considering a scenario
with 20 vehicles to demonstrate that all pairwise distances be-
tween vehicles can be kept above a minimum safety distances
throughout a scenario.
This paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses
background information for barrier certificates. Section III
discusses a general method for constructing a barrier certificate
and shows how to apply it to fixed wing collision avoidance.
Section IV generalizes the results of Section III by showing
how to satisfy multiple constraints simultaneously. Section V
relaxes the amount of information required to share between
vehicles while still guaranteeing safety. Section VI presents a
simulation verification of the approach. Section VII concludes.
II. BARRIER CERTIFICATES BACKGROUND
We summarize the necessary background for barrier certifi-
cates here. See [20] for a more complete discussion. Consider
a control affine system
x˙ = f(x) + g(x)u (1)
where f and g are locally Lipschitz, x ∈ Rn, u ∈ U ⊆ Rm,
and solutions are forward complete, meaning the system has
a unique solution for all time greater than or equal to 0 given
a starting condition x(0).
To use this formation for a set of vehicles, suppose there are
k vehicles with state xi and dynamics x˙i = fi(xi) + gi(xi)ui
where xi ∈ Rni , ui ∈ Ui ⊆ Rmi and i ∈ {1, . . . , k}. The
overall state is x =
[
xT1 x
T
2 · · · xTk
]T ∈ Rn where n =∑k
i=1 ni and u =
[
uT1 u
T
2 · · · uTk
]T ∈ U1 × U2 × · · · ×
3Uk = U ⊆ Rm where m = m1 + · · · + mk. In this case, (1)
can be represented as
x˙ =

f1(x1)
f2(x2)
...
fk(xk)
+

g1(x1) 0 · · · 0
0 g2(x2) · · · 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 · · · gk(xk)


u1
u2
...
uk
 .
In this paper we model the individual vehicles with state xi =[
pi,x pi,y θi
]T
and ui =
[
vi ωi
]T
with dynamics
x˙i =
cos(θi) 0sin(θi) 0
0 1
[vi
ωi
]
, (2)
where vi ∈ [vmin, vmax] with vmin > 0 and |ωi| ≤ ωmax. Let
h : Rn → R be an output function, D ⊂ Rn an open set, and
denote the superlevel set
Ch = {x ∈ D : h(x) ≥ 0}. (3)
Definition 1. [20] Given a set Ch ⊂ Rn defined in (3) for a
continuously differentiable function h : Rn → R, the function
h is called a zeroing control barrier function (ZCBF) defined
on a set D with Ch ⊆ D ⊂ Rn, if there exists a Lipschitz
continuous extended class K function α such that
sup
u∈U
[Lfh(x) + Lgh(x)u+ α(h(x))] ≥ 0, ∀x ∈ D. (4)
In the above definition Lfh and Lgh denote the Lie deriva-
tives. The admissible control space is defined as
Kh = {u ∈ U : Lfh(x) + Lgh(x)u+ α(h(x)) ≥ 0}. (5)
Theorem 1. [20] Given a set Ch ⊆ Rn defined in (3) for a
continuously differentiable function h, if h is a ZCBF on D,
then any Lipschitz continuous controller u : D → U such that
u(x) ∈ Kh(x) will render the set Ch forward invariant.
In [20] it is also shown how to calculate u(x) ∈ Kh(x)
using a Quadratic Program (QP) to support fast, online
calculations. In particular, assume there is some nominal uˆ
available that is designed to achieve some performance goal
(e.g., path-following) that has not necessarily been designed
to satisfy safety constraints. Additionally, we assume U can
be expressed as the set of all u satisfying the linear inequality
Au ≥ b. The safe control input can then be calculated using
a QP as follows
u∗ = min
u∈Rm
1
2
‖u− uˆ‖2 (6a)
s.t. Lfh(x) + Lgh(x)u+ α(h(x)) ≥ 0 (6b)
Au ≥ b. (6c)
Note that by property (4), when h is a ZCBF, (6) is
guaranteed to be feasible when x ∈ D.
III. BARRIER CERTIFICATE CONSTRUCTION
A. Motivating Example
In this section we discuss some difficulties with applying
barrier certificates to the fixed-wing collision avoidance prob-
lem via a concrete example. Consider a candidate ZCBF, h,
that encodes a collision avoidance safety constraint
h(x(t)) = d1,2(x)−D2s , (7)
where d1,2(x) = (p1,x(t)− p2,x(t))2 + (p1,y(t)− p2,y(t))2 is
the squared distance between vehicles 1 and 2 and Ds is a
minimum safety distance.
One common approach for systems with relative degree
equal to one is to use the safety constraint directly as a ZCBF.
However, when actuator constraints are present, the safety
constraint may fail to be a valid ZCBF. To show why h defined
in (7) is not a ZCBF, we present an example where x ∈ Ch
but h does not satisfy (4). Let x1 =
[−Ds/2 0 0]T and
x2 =
[
Ds/2 0 pi
]T
so that x =
[
xT1 x
T
2
]T ∈ Ch because
h(x) = 0. Further,
sup
u∈U
[Lfh(x) + Lgh(x)u+ α(h(x))]
= sup
u∈U
[
2(p1,x(t)− p2,x(t))(v1 cos θ1(t)− v2 cos θ2(t))
+ 2(p1,y(t)− p2,y(t))(v1 sin θ1(t)− v2 sin θ2(t))
]
= sup
u∈U
[−2Ds(v1 + v2)]
= −4Dsvmin.
Since vmin > 0 and Ds > 0, supu∈U [Lfh(x) + Lgh(x)u +
α(h(x))] < 0 so h is not a ZCBF. The problem with this
candidate ZCBF is that it does not account for the fact that
by the time the vehicles are close to colliding, it may be too
late to avoid each other due to the limited turning radius and
positive minimum velocity.
B. Constructing a Barrier Certificate via Evading Maneuvers
In order to overcome the difficulties demonstrated in the
example of Section III-A, we introduce a method to construct
a ZCBF from a safety constraint. Let ρ : D → R be a safety
function that represents the safety objective we want to satisfy
at all times so that ρ(x) ≥ 0 indicates that the system is safe.
In the example from Section III-A for vehicles i and j,
ρ(x(t)) = di,j(x)−D2s . (8)
Second, let γ : D → U be a nominal evading maneuver.
Section III-C discusses specific examples of γ for the UAV
collision avoidance problem. For now, assuming γ has been
selected, let
h(x(t); ρ, γ) = inf
τ∈[0,∞)
ρ(xˆ(t+ τ)), (9)
be a candidate ZCBF where xˆ and ˙ˆx are given by
xˆ(t+ τ) = x(t) +
∫ τ
0
˙ˆx(t+ η)dη, (10)
˙ˆx(t+ τ) = f(xˆ(t+ τ)) + g(xˆ(t+ τ))γ(xˆ(t+ τ)). (11)
4This choice of a candidate ZCBF h is motivated by the fact
that in (9), h measures how close the state will get to the
boundary of the safe set assuming γ is used as the control
input for all future time. We first establish sufficient conditions
under which h is differentiable. To do this, we assume that h
has a unique x minimizer. In other words, there is a unique
xmin ∈ D such that h(x) = ρ(xmin) where xmin = xˆ(t + τ)
for at least one τ ≥ 0. See the appendix for the proof.
Theorem 2. Assume h is defined in (9) and is constructed
from ρ : D → R and γ : D → U . Let h have a unique x
minimizer for all x ∈ D, ρ be continuously differentiable, and
γ be such that f(x) + g(x)γ(x) is continuously differentiable.
Then h is continuously differentiable.
Remark 1. For cases where the candidate ZCBF h has multiple
x minima at xmin1 , . . . , xminl for some integer l > 1, the
derivative will not necessarily be smooth. See [34] for handling
this case.
In Section III-A we saw that we could not use the Euclidean
distance for a ZCBF because when a candidate ZCBF h is
defined as in (7), Kh could be empty even though h was non-
negative. In other words, h could be non-negative but there
was no control input available to keep the system safe. With
h defined in (9), this problem is alleviated.
Theorem 3. Assume h in (9) is continuously differentiable
and γ is locally Lipschitz. Then h is a ZCBF on Ch. If in
addition, Lgh(x) is non-zero for some x ∈ ∂Ch and γ maps
to values in the interior of U , then h is a ZCBF on a set D
where Ch ⊂ D.
Proof. We start by assuming x ∈ Ch and show that h satisfies
(4). Because x ∈ Ch, h(x) ≥ 0 so α(h(x)) ≥ 0. Further,
note that Lfh(x) + Lgh(x)γ(x) is the derivative along the
trajectory of xˆ. In other words,
Lfh(x(t)) + Lgh(x(t))γ(x(t)) =
lim
a→0+
1
a
(
inf
τ∈[a,∞)
ρ(xˆ(t+ τ))− inf
τ∈[0,∞)
ρ(xˆ(t+ τ))
)
.
(12)
Consider the term inside the parenthesis in (12), namely
inf
τ∈[a,∞)
ρ(xˆ(t+ τ))− inf
τ∈[0,∞)
ρ(xˆ(t+ τ))
and notice that it is the subtraction of an infimum of the
same function ρ evaluated on two different intervals. Further,
note that the first interval is a subset of the second interval
since a approaches 0 from above. Thus, the term inside the
parenthesis on the right hand side of (12) is non-negative
so Lfh(x) + Lgh(x)γ(x) ≥ 0. We can then conclude that
Lfh(x) + Lgh(x)γ(x) + α(h(x)) ≥ 0 so γ(x) ∈ Kh(x).
Now assume that Lgh(x) is non-zero for some x ∈ ∂Ch and
γ maps to values in the interior of U . We will show that there
is a set D that is a strict superset of Ch for which (4) holds. Let
x ∈ ∂Ch be such that Lgh(x) is non-zero and B(x, δ) be a ball
of radius δ > 0 such that for all z ∈ B(x, δ) \ Ch, Lfh(z) is
non-zero. Such a ball exists such that B(x, δ)\Ch is nonempty
because Lgh(x) is continuous. Let d(z) be a non-zero vector
such that d(z) + γ(x) ∈ U where d(z) is a non-zero vector in
uˆ
U
Kh
γ(x)
Fig. 1: A geometric view of why h defined in (9) can be a
barrier function. Here U is shown as a closed convex polytope
satisfying U = {u : Au ≥ b} and Kh is the half-space. The
constraint (4) implies that the intersection of U and Kh is non-
empty. When h is defined in (9), it satisfies this constraint by
ensuring that γ(x) ∈ U and γ(x) ∈ Kh for all x ∈ Ch.
the direction of Lgh(z). Note that such a vector exists because
γ maps to the interior of U . Also note that Lgh(z)d(z) > 0.
Further restrict δ so that Lgh(z)d(z) + α(h(z)) ≥ 0 for all
z ∈ B(x; δ)\Ch. Note that for similar reasons discussed earlier
in the proof, Lfh(z) + Lgh(z)γ(z) ≥ 0. Then
Lfh(z) + Lgh(z)(γ(z) + d) + α(h(z))
≥ Lgh(x)d+ α(h(z))
≥ 0.
Remark 2. In Definition 1 there must exist a class K function
α satisfying supu∈U [Lfh(x) +Lgh(x) +α(h(x))] ≥ 0 which
implies that an α must also be found to specify a valid ZCBF.
The above result holds for all α, resolving this ambiguity.
Remark 3. The intuitive reason why h is a ZCBF is that
whenever h(x) is non-negative, we have by definition a control
input γ available to keep the system safe. A geometric view
is presented in Figure 1. Note that γ is not the output of the
Quadratic Program (6). Instead, the role of γ is to allow h to
be evaluated via (9).
C. Deriving a Barrier Certificate for UAV Collision Avoidance
We now consider how to calculate h defined in (9) for the
UAV collision avoidance problem. From Theorem 3 the only
restriction on γ and ρ is that γ is locally Lipschitz and that
h is continuously differentiable so there is some flexibility in
choosing γ and ρ. In this section we discuss two cases where
we can choose γ and ρ so that h can be calculated in closed
form. Let the initial state for vehicle i (i = 1, 2) be given by[
pi,x0 pi,y0 θi,0
]T
.
Example 1. In the first case, let
ρ(x) = d1,2(x)− δ + δ cos(θ1)−D2s , (13)
5where δ > 0 is introduced to (8) so that h will be continuously
differentiable. Let
γturn =
[
σv ω v ω
]T
(14)
with σ 6= 0, ω 6= 0. In other words, γturn is defined by
the same turn rate for both vehicles but possibly different
translational velocities. Letting b1,0 = p1,x0 − σ vω sin(θ1,0),
b2,0 = p2,x0 − vω sin(θ2,0), c1,0 = p1,y0 +σ vω cos(θi,0), c2,0 =
p2,y0 +
v
ω cos(θ2,0), ∆b0 = b1,0− b2,0, and ∆c0 = c1,0− c2,0,
h(x) =
inf
τ∈[0,∞)
(
∆b0 + σ
v
ω
sin(ωτ + θ1,0)− v
ω
sin(ωτ + θ2,0))
)2
+
(
∆c0 − σ v
ω
cos(ωτ + θ1,0) +
v
ω
cos(ωτ + θ2,0)
)2
−δ + δ cos(ωτ + θ1,0)−D2s .
By expanding the square terms and applying two trigonometric
identities,1 we get
h(x) =
inf
τ∈[0,∞)
∆b20 + ∆c
2
0 + (1 + σ
2)
v2
ω2
− 2σ v
2
ω2
cos(θ1,0 − θ2,0)
+2σ∆b0
v
ω
sin(ωτ + θ1,0)− 2∆b0 v
ω
sin(ωτ + θ2,0)
−2σ∆c0 v
ω
cos(ωτ + θ1,0) + 2∆c0
v
ω
cos(ωτ + θ2,0)
−δ + δ cos(ωτ + θ1,0)−D2s .
Grouping constant terms and applying phasor addition yields
h(x) = inf
τ∈[0,∞)
A1 +A2 cos(ωτ + Θ)−D2s ,
where A1 results from grouping constant terms, while A2
and Θ are the amplitude and phase resulting from the phasor
addition. Then in this case h(x) = A1 − A2 −D2s . Note that
for the case where
ρ(x) =
√
d1,2(x)− δ + δ cos(θ1)−Ds, (15)
the same reasoning yields h(x) =
√
A1 −A2 − Ds for ρ
defined in (15). Note that A1 − A2 ≥ 0 provided that the
vehicles do not get more than 2δ from each other along the
trajectory defined by (10) using γturn in (14).
Example 2. For a second case where we can solve (9) in
closed form, let ρ be given in (8) and
γstraight =
[
v1 0 v2 0
]T
, (16)
where v1 6= v2. In other words, γstraight uses a 0 turn rate
while allowing the vehicles to have different speeds. In this
case we have
h(x) =
inf
τ∈[0,∞)
(pa,x0 + tv1 cos(θa,0)− pb,x0 − tv2 cos(θb,0))2
+ (pa,y0 + tv1 sin(θa,0)− pb,y0 − tv2 sin(θb,0))2 −D2s ,
which is quadratic in t so the minimum can be calculated in
closed form.
1The identities are sin2(α) + cos2(α) = 1 and cos(α − β) =
cos(α) cos(β) + sin(α) sin(β).
D. Simulation of Two Vehicles
We demonstrate the theoretical development of this section
in simulation using SCRIMMAGE [36]. SCRIMMAGE is a
multi-agent simulator designed to scale to high numbers of
vehicles and includes a plugin-interface that makes it easy
to experiment with different motion models and controllers
without having to change code. This makes it simple to swap
out nominal controllers and vary the fidelity of fixed-wing
UAVs from the unicycle dynamics in (2) used in this section
up to a 6-DOF model.
For the simulation, let k vehicles be positioned in a
circle of radius 200 around the origin, where k = 2 in
this simulation. In other words, vehicle i has initial state
xi =
[
200 cos
(
i 2pik + pi
)
200 sin
(
i 2pik + pi
)
i 2pik + ψ
]T
,
where ψ is an additional offset so that vehicles are not
necessarily starting with orientation pointing at the origin. The
goal position for vehicle i is on the other side of the origin:
xi,g =
[
200 cos
(
i 2pik
)
200 sin
(
i 2pik pi
)]T
.
This setup is selected so that the vehicles are on a collision
course. The nominal controller is that described in [37] with
constant λ = 1. Additionally, we let vmin = 15 meters/second,
vmax = 25 meters/second, ωmax = 13 degrees/second,
Ds = 5 meters, and δ = 0.01 meters2. ωmax is chosen to
be consistent with a constant rate turn [38] with a 30 degree
bank with a speed of vmax. Each vehicle evaluates (6) at each
timestep where we use OSCP [39] to evaluate the QP. We
investigate the performance of the vehicles when h defined
in (9) is constructed from γturn in (14) and γstraight (17),
respectively, where γturn =
[
1.1v ω v ω
]T
, γstraight =[
1.1v 0 v 0
]T
, and v = 0.9vmin + 0.1vmax and ω =
0.9ωmax. For the scenario with γturn, we let ψ = 0 so that
the vehicles start with orientation pointing at the origin. For
the scenario with γstraight, we let ψ = 2◦ because if the
vehicles pointed at the origin they would not start in the safe
set. Additionally, for the γturn case we use ρ in (15). Similarly,
for the γstraight case we use ρ(x) =
√
d1,2(x)−Ds. Details
of the distance between the vehicles and control signals are
shown in Figure 2. Note that the resulting trajectory can be
different depending on which γ is used as shown in Figure 2d.
Nevertheless, in both cases the vehicles are able to maintain
safe distances from each other and satisfy actuator constraints
throughout the simulation regardless of which γ is used to
construct a h.
IV. COMPOSITION OF MULTIPLE SAFETY
CONSTRAINTS
A. Motivating Example
Although the constructive method introduced in (9) can pro-
duce a barrier certificate in the presence of actuator constraints
that ensures two vehicles do not collide, the formulation does
not extend immediately to collision avoidance for systems with
more than two vehicles. To see this, we present a specific
example where three UAVs with a collision avoidance safety
objective cannot use the results from Section III-B to ensure
safety. A plot of this scenario is shown in Figure 3. We index
the vehicles by i = 1, 2, 3. To ensure collision-free trajectories,
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Fig. 2: Outputs for the scenario with 2 fixed-wing vehicles.
The blue dashed and orange solid lines are the output of the
scenario where h is constructed from γstraight and γturn,
respectively. Vehicle 1 velocity and turn rates are shown to
be within the actuator limits in (a) and (b). The minimum
distance between the vehicles is shown to be above Ds in (c)
where the output is very similar in both scenarios. The path
taken by vehicle 1 is shown in (d). Note that the choice of γ
in constructing h has a significant effect on the path taken.
and considering the safety function defined in (13), three
pairwise constraints must be nonnegative at all times:
ρ1(x) = d1,2(x)− δ + δ cos(θ1)−D2s ,
ρ2(x) = d1,3(x)− δ + δ cos(θ1)−D2s ,
ρ3(x) = d2,3(x)− δ + δ cos(θ2)−D2s .
We now apply these results of Section III to these constraints
and for simplicity, let δ be approximately 0. For each con-
straint, define an arbitrarily chosen nominal evading maneuver
γ1(x) =
[
1 −1 1 −1 1 −1]T (16a)
γ2(x) = γ3(x) =
[
1 1 1 1 1 1
]T
. (16b)
In other words, γ1 encodes an evasive maneuver where all
the vehicles turn right while γ2 and γ3 encode a maneuver
where all the vehicles turn left. We note that hj (j = 1, . . . , 3)
defined in (9) and constructed from ρj and γj are ZCBFs. In
this example we let vmin = 1, vmax = 2, ωmax = 1, and
Ds = 0.5 so that the vehicles follow a circular trajectory with
radius r = 1 when applying vmin and ωmax. Assume now
that the vehicles have the following initial states
x1 =
[
0 0 0
]T
,
x2 =
[
(2r +Ds) sinψ (2r +Ds) cosψ − 2r pi
]T
,
x3 =
[
(2r +Ds) sinψ 2r − (2r +Ds) cosψ pi
]T
,
where ψ = arccos
(
Ds/2+2r
2r+Ds
)
. Then h1(x) = h2(x) =
h3(x) = 0 and the barrier constraints in (4) for h1(x) and
h2(x) become
−0.4(v1 + ω1 + v2 + ω2) ≥ 0 (17)
0.4(−v1 + ω1 − v3 + ω3) ≥ 0. (18)
Although h1 and h2 are ZCBFs, these two constraints cannot
be simultaneously satisfied for vi ∈ [vmin, vmax] and |ωi| ≤
ωmax. In particular, after substituting the minimum velocity
v1 = v2 = 1, the first equation dictates that ω1 + ω2 ≤ −2
(i.e., vehicles 1 and 2 must turn right). Similarly, the second
equation dictates that vehicle 1 and 3 must turn left. The prob-
lem with this scenario is that vehicle 1 cannot simultaneously
execute both nominal evading maneuvers (i.e., turn both left
and right at the same time). To solve this problem, we will
make sure that the evasive maneuver applied by a vehicle is
the same for every barrier certificate. A geometric view of the
general problem and its solution are shown in Figure 4.
B. Problem Statement For Satisfying Multiple Objectives
In order to solve the issues arising when vehicles have to
simultaneously respect multiple constraints, we now extend
the use of the constructive technique introduced in (9).
Suppose there are q constraints ρj : D → R (j = 1, . . . , q)
that must be greater than or equal to 0 at all times. For the k
agents with pairwise constraints q = k(k − 1)/2. We assume
that for each constraint j = 1, . . . , q, a locally Lipschitz
nominal evading maneuver γj has been selected using the
framework in (9). An example for fixed-wing UAVs with
collision avoidance safety constraints is given in (14). We
assume hj is constructed according to (9) and is continuously
differentiable so that hj is a ZCBF for j = 1, . . . , q. Denote
the overall safe set and overall admissible control space as
C∩ = Ch1 ∩ · · · ∩ Chq , (19)
K∩(x) = {u ∈ U : u ∈ Kh1(x) ∩Kh2(x) ∩ · · · ∩Khq (x)}.
Lemma 1. Suppose hj is a ZCBF for j = 1, . . . , q. Then
any Lipschitz continuous controller u : Ch → U such that
u(x) ∈ K∩(x) will render the set C∩ forward invariant.
Proof. Suppose x ∈ C∩. Then x ∈ Chj for j = 1, . . . , q.
Because u ∈ K∩, u ∈ Khj for j = 1, . . . , q, so it follows
from Theorem 1 that Chj is forward invariant. In other words,
if x(0) ∈ C∩ then x(t) ∈ Chj for all t ≥ 0 for j = 1, . . . , q.
71
2
(a)
1
3
(b)
1
2
3
(c)
Fig. 3: A geometric view of the example given in Section IV-A. In (a), h1 defined in (9) is constructed to design a certificate
so that vehicles 1 and 2 stay safe. Here γ1 encodes an evasive maneuver where vehicles 1 and 2 turn right. Further, vehicles
1 and 2 are placed so that turning right is the only available control input to keep the system safe. In (b), a similar setup is
shown for vehicles 1 and 3 where h2 has been constructed from γ2 which enodes an evasive manuever where vehicles 1 and
3 turn left and vehicles 1 and 3 placed so they are only able to turn left to stay safe. In (c), vehicle 1 cannot turn both right
and left to avoid vehicles 2 and 3, respectively. Although vehicle 1 can avoid them individually, it cannot avoid them both
simultaneously.
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Fig. 4: A geometric view of why having a set of individual barrier certificates does not guarantee that a control input u exists
to satisfy each associated constraint and how the shared evading maneuver assumption resolves this issue. In (a), multiple
barrier function constraints are shown as half-spaces. To satisfy Lemma 1, a u must be selected that is in the intersection
of Kh1 , Kh2 , and U . In (b), although there exists a u that is in the intersection of U and Kh1 as well as U and Kh2 , as
guaranteed by the fact that h1 and h2 are ZCBFs, there does not exist a u that is in the intersection of U , Kh1 , and Kh2 . This
case corresponds to the specific scenario for the three vehicle collision avoidance problem in Fig. 3c. In (c), the problem is
resolved by the shared evading maneuver because γs(x) satisfies each constraint.
Therefore if x(0) ∈ C∩ then x(t) ∈ C∩ for all t ≥ 0 so C∩
is forward invariant.
C. The Shared Nominal Evading Maneuver Assumption
Section IV-A showed an example where K∩ could be empty
for some x ∈ C∩. As a result, the assumptions of Lemma 1
could not be satisfied. In order to address the issue discussed in
Section IV-A, we introduce an additional constraint on γj (j =
1, . . . , q) that all hj are constructed from the same nominal
evading maneuver.
Definition 2. Suppose every hj (j = 1, . . . , q) is defined as
in (9) and is constructed from γj , respectively. The shared
evading maneuver assumption holds if γ1(x) = · · · = γq(x)
for all x ∈ D. The shared evading maneuver is denoted γs so
that γs(x) = γ1(x) = · · · = γq(x) for all x ∈ D.
Remark 4. This assumption requires that each hj
(j = 1, . . . , q) be constructed from the same nominal evading
maneuver. Note, however, that this does not imply that each
hj must be constructed from the same safety function ρj .
The example in Section IV-A does not satisfy the shared
evading maneuver assumption because γ1(x) and γ2(x) de-
fined in (17) are not the same. To enforce that the shared
evasive maneuver assumption holds, one option is to change
γ1 so that
γ1(x) =
[
1 1 1 1 1 1
]T
. (20)
In other words, using γ1 defined in (20) and γ2 and γ3 in (16b)
implies an evasive maneuver where all vehicles turn left for
each constraint. Another example where the shared nominal
8evading maneuver assumption holds is as follows:
γs(x) = γ1(x) = γ2(x) = γ3(x) =[
1 1 1.5 0 2 −1]T .
In this case, γs(x) encodes an evasive maneuver where vehicle
1 turns left with a linear velocity of 1, vehicle 2 stays straight
with a linear velocity of 1.5, and vehicle 3 turns right with a
linear velocity of 2. These three nominal evading maneuvers
satisfy the shared evasive maneuver assumption because for
all x ∈ D, γ1(x) = γ2(x) = γ3(x).
To see the purpose of the shared evading maneuver as-
sumption, we first examine the case of a single constraint.
In particular, let h be defined in (9) and consider the role of
γ in establishing that h is a ZCBF. From Definition 1, for h
to be used for a barrier certificate, Kh(x) must be nonempty
for all x ∈ Dh. With h defined as in (9), this property is
satisfied by γ(x) for all x ∈ Ch (see Theorem 3). The analogue
condition for multiple constraints is that K∩(x) is non-empty
for all x ∈ C∩. If each hj defined in (9) is a ZCBF and is
constructed from γj then by similar reasoning to Theorem 3,
γj(x) ∈ Khj (x) for all x ∈ Chj . If γ1(x) = · · · = γj(x) for
all x ∈ C∩ then we can additionally conclude that K∩(x) is
non-empty for all x ∈ Chj .
D. Calculating a Safe Control Law
With the shared evading maneuver assumption, we can
calculate u ∈ K∩ so that u is Lipschitz continuous. To
do so, we write the QP in (6) with q constraints and let
uˆ =
[
uˆT1 uˆ
T
2 · · · uˆTk
]T
where uˆi is the nominal input
of vehicle i for i = 1, . . . , k. To emphasize that all hj
are constructed from γs, we write hj(x; ρj , γs) for each
j = 1, . . . , q.
u∗ = min
u∈Rm
1
2
‖u− uˆ‖2 (21)
s.t. Au ≥ b.
Lfh
j(x; ρj , γs) + Lgh
j(x; ρj , γs)u
+α(hj(x; ρj , γs)) ≥ 0 j ∈ {1, . . . , q}
Theorem 4. Suppose C∩ is defined as in (19) where hj
(j = 1, . . . , q) defined in (9) is continuously differentiable and
the shared evading maneuver assumption holds. In addition,
suppose that hj has a Lipschitz continuous derivative for
j = 1, . . . , q, uˆ and γs are Lipschitz continuous, γs maps
to the interior of U , and that x is in the interior of C∩. Then
u∗ in (21) is Lipschitz continuous and C∩ is forward invariant.
Proof. Under these assumptions γs is strictly feasible so u∗ is
Lipschitz continuous as an application of Theorem 1 of [40].
C∩ is then forward invariant by Lemma 1.
Theorem 4 gives conditions for ensuring that for all x ∈ C∩,
a Lipschitz continuous u ∈ K∩(x) can be calculated, thus
resolving the issue presented in Section IV-A. A geometric
view of the problem and resolution is shown in Figure 4.
V. DECENTRALIZED CONTROL CALCULATION
The QP in (21) is a centralized calculation. In particular, it
requires that each vehicle’s nominal control input uˆi be com-
municated. Frequently communicating this signal when there
are many vehicles may reduce throughput for other important
messages or introduce communication delays. Thus, we show
how to ensure safety constraints can be satisfied by reformu-
lating the QP so that the vehicles can calculate a safe control
signal without requiring each other’s nominal control input.
Let γs =
[
γs
T
1 · · · γs
T
k
]T
, where γsi maps to vectors
of the same size as ui for i = 1, . . . , k with similar de-
composition for b =
[
bT1 · · · bTk
]T
and Lghj(x; ρj ; γs) =[
[Lgh
j(x; ρj ; γs)]T1 · · · [Lghj(x; ρj ; γs)]Tk
]T
. Further, as-
sume A in (6c) is block diagonal with block entries Ai
for i = 1, . . . , k where Ai is a mi × mi matrix. This
assumption means that actuator constraints are not coupled
between vehicles. For constraint j for j = 1, . . . , q, let
ζj = {i ∈ {1, . . . , k} : ∃x ∈ D s.t. [Lghj(x; ρj , γs)]i 6= 0mi}
where 0mi is the zero vector in Rmi . ζj represents the set of
vehicles whose control input affects the time derivative of hj
for some x ∈ D. We let |ζj | denote the cardinality of ζj , and
note that for the case of pairwise collision avoidance, |ζj | = 2
for all j = 1, . . . , q. In the example with three vehicles in
Section IV, ζ1 = {1, 2}, ζ2 = {1, 3}, ζ3 = {2, 3}. Finally,
we denote u\i =
[
uT1 · · · uTi−1 uTi+1 · · · uTk
]T
, with
similar definitions for γs\i, uˆ\i, and [Lgh
j(x; ρj ; γs)]\i.
With the above definitions, we can now state a decentralized
analogue for the admissible control space in (5). The decentral-
ized admissible control space for constraint j (j = 1, . . . , q)
and vehicle i (i ∈ ζj) is defined as
Ki,j(x) = {ui ∈ Ui :
Lfh
j(x; ρj , γs) + [Lgh
j(x; ρj , γs)]iui + α(h
j(x; ρj , γs))
+[Lgh
j(x; ρj , γs)]\iγs\i(x)
−|ζ
j | − 1
|ζj |
(
Lfh
j(x; ρj , γs) + Lgh
j(x; ρj , γs)γs(x)
+α(hj(x; ρj , γs))
)
≥ 0}.
Let Ai = {j ∈ {1, . . . , q} : i ∈ ζj} so that Ai is the set of
indices where ui has an effect on the time derivative of the
associated barrier certificate for some x ∈ D. For the three
vehicle example of Section IV, A1 = {1, 2}, A2 = {1, 3},
A3 = {2, 3}. The decentralized admissible control space
for vehicle i is then Ki(x) =
⋂
l∈Ai Ki,l and the overall
decentralized admissible control space is
K(x) =
{u = [uT1 · · · uTk ]T ∈ U : ui ∈ Ki(x) ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , k}}.
Theorem 5. Suppose C∩ is defined as in (19) where hj is
continuously differentiable and the shared evading maneuver
assumption holds where γs is locally Lipschitz. Then ∀x ∈ C∩,
γs ∈ K(x) and K(x) ⊆ K∩(x).
9Proof. Consider the first statement, namely that γs ∈ K(x).
For j = 1, . . . , q, consider any i ∈ ζj and let ui = γsi . Then
Lfh
j(x; ρj , γs) + [Lgh
j(x; ρj , γs)]iui + α(h
j(x; ρj , γs))
+[Lgh
j(x; ρj , γs)]\iγs\i(x)
−|ζ
j | − 1
|ζj |
(
Lfh
j(x; ρj , γs) + Lgh
j(x; ρj , γs)γs(x)
+α(hj(x; ρj , γs))
)
=
1
|ζj | (Lfh
j(x) + Lgh
j(x)γs(x) + α(hj(x))) ≥ 0.
The inequality is true because x ∈ C∩ implies
α(hj(x; ρj , γs)) ≥ 0. See the proof for Theorem 3 for why
Lfh
j(x; ρj , γs) + Lgh
j(x; ρj , γs)γs(x) ≥ 0. Then γsi ∈ Ki,j
for any j = 1, . . . , q and i ∈ ζj . Then γsi ∈ Ki. Then
γs(x) ∈ K(x).
For the second statement, assume u ∈ K(x) so that ui ∈
Ki(x) ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , k}. This means that Aiui ≥ bi so that,
because A is block diagonal, Au ≥ b. Further, it means that
for any constraint j = 1, . . . , q and any i ∈ ζj ,
Lfh
j(x; ρj , γs) + [Lgh
j(x; ρj , γs)]iui + α(h
j(x; ρj , γs))
+[Lgh
j(x; ρj , γs)]\iγs\i(x)
−|ζ
j | − 1
|ζj |
(
Lfh
j(x; ρj , γs) + Lgh
j(x; ρj , γs)γs(x)
+α(hj(x; ρj , γs))
)
≥ 0. (22)
To simplify (22), note that by definition, [Lgh(x)]i = 0 for
i 6= ζj so that∑
i∈ζj
[Lgh
j(x; ρj ; γs)]iui =
∑
i∈{1,...,k}
[Lgh
j(x; ρj ; γs)]iui
= Lgh
j(x; ρj ; γs)u. (23)
Using (23) in the following then yields∑
i∈ζj
[Lgh
j(x; ρj , γs)]\iγs\i(x)
=
∑
i∈ζj
(
Lgh
j(x; ρj , γs)γs(x)− [Lghj(x; ρj , γs)]iγsi (x)
)
= |ζj |Lghj(x; ρj , γs)γs(x)−
∑
i∈ζj
[Lgh
j(x; ρj , γs)]iγ
s
i (x)
= |ζj |Lghj(x; ρj , γs)γs(x)− Lghj(x; ρj , γs)γs(x)
= (|ζj | − 1)Lghj(x; ρj , γs)γs(x). (24)
Summing (22) over i ∈ ζj and using (23) and (24) yields
0 ≤ |ζj |Lfhj(x; ρj , γs) + Lghj(x; ρj , γs)u
+|ζj |α(hj(x; ρj , γs)) + (|ζj | − 1)Lghj(x; ρj , γs)γs(x)
−(|ζj | − 1)
(
Lfh
j(x; ρj , γs) + Lgh
j(x; ρj , γs)γs(x)
+α(hj(x; ρj , γs))
)
= Lfh
j(x; ρs, γs) + Lgh
j(x; ρs, γs)u+ α(hj(x; ρs, γs)).
Since this is true for all j = 1, . . . , q, u ∈ K∩(x). Then
K(x) ⊆ K∩(x) for all x ∈ C∩.
In particular, Theorem 5 implies that when vehicle i (for all
i ∈ {1, . . . , k}) calculates the following QP, the QP will be
feasible for all x ∈ C∩, and C∩ will be forward invariant:
u∗i = min
ui∈Rmi
1
2
‖ui − uˆi‖2 (25)
s.t. Aiui ≥ bi
Lfh
j(x; ρj , γs) + [Lgh
j(x; ρj , γs)]iui
+α(hj(x; ρj , γs)) + [Lgh
j(x; ρj , γs)]\iγs\i(x)
−|ζ
j | − 1
|ζj |
(
Lfh
j(x; ρj , γs) + Lgh
j(x; ρj , γs)γs(x)
+α(hj(x; ρj , γs))
)
j ∈ Ai
Theorem 6. Under the same assumptions of Theorem 4, u∗i
in (25) is Lipschitz continuous and C∩ is forward invariant.
Proof. γsi is strictly feasible so u
∗
i is Lipschitz continuous as
an application of Theorem 1 of [40]. Then u =
[
u∗1 · · ·u∗k
]T
is Lipschitz continuous and because u∗i ∈ Ki(x), u ∈ K(x).
Then by Theorem 5, u ∈ K∩(x) and C∩ is forward invariant
by Lemma 1.
We note that the solution from the centralized QP (21) may
be different than the solution from the decentralized QPs (25)
because K(x) may be a strict subset of K∩(x). To see this,
let k = 2, q = 1, Lfh(x) = 0, α(h(x)) = 0, m1 = m2 = 1,
[Lgh(x)]2γ
s
2(x) = −1, and [Lgh(x)]1γs1(x) = 1. Then the
barrier certificate constraint in (25) becomes [Lgh(x)]1u1 ≥
1, while the barrier certificate constraint in (21) becomes
Lgh(x)u ≥ 0. Since u1 = 0 is feasible for the latter but
not the former equation, we do not have that K(x) = K∩(x).
Although the decentralized QP (25) can be used to ensure
safety by Theorem 6, because K(x) ⊂ K∩(x), it may be that
the total cost of each vehicle calculating (25) is higher than
the centralized calculation (21). In other words, the calculated
safe control may not be as close to the nominal control signal
in a least squares sense when using (25) as opposed to (21).
Another difference between the decentralized (25) and the
centralized (21) QPs is how the size of the optimization
variable and number of constraints vary with the number of
vehicles k. In the centralized approach (21) the size of the
optimization variable grows linearly with k while the number
of constraints grows quadratically. On the other hand, in the
decentralized QP (25), the size of the optimization variable and
number of constraints are constant and linear, respectively.
VI. SIMULATION
In this section we repeat the scenario discussed in Sec-
tion III-D but consider k = 20 vehicles. For the scenario
where h is constructed from γturn, we use
[
v ω v ω
]T
where v = 0.9vmin + 0.1vmax and ω = 0.9ωmax. For
the scenario where h is constructed from γstraight, we let
γi =
[
(1 + 0.01i)v 0
]T
so that each vehicle uses a dif-
ferent translational velocity as is required to ensure dif-
ferentiability of h (see Section III-C). Note that this does
not violate the shared evading maneuver assumption because
γs =
[
(γ1)T · · · (γk)T ]T . Additionally, we let ψ = 0 and
ψ = 25◦ in the scenario where h is constructed from γturn and
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γstraight, respectively. Offsetting the initial orientation 25◦
from pointing at the origin is required so that the vehicles
can start in the safe set when using γstraight. Screenshots
for the case of γturn and γstraight are shown in Figures 5
and 6, respectively. Quantitative results for both scenarios
are shown in Figure 7 which shows similar outputs to the
results for the two vehicle simulation shown in Figure 2.
In particular, the pairwise distance between all vehicles are
kept above the minimum safety distance Ds while satisfying
actuator constraints.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have examined how to ensure that for
vehicles characterized by constrained inputs, multiple barrier
certificates can be satisfied simultaneously while relaxing
communication requirements. The resulting solution is a de-
centralized algorithm that was applied to a collision avoidance
scenario with fixed-wing UAVs where in spite of commu-
nication restrictions, the vehicles are able to maintain safe
distances from each other.
APPENDIX A
PROOF FOR THEOREM 2
Proof. Starting from the definition of the derivative of h from
(9), we expand terms using a Taylor series and simplify the
expression using an argument by contradiction. Let νk be a
sequence in Rn approaching zero, xˆ + δxk be the trajectory
starting from x(t)+νk rather than x(t),
∂xˆ(t+τ)
∂x(t) the derivative
of the solution at time t+ τ with respect to initial conditions,
and τ1 ≥ 0 a time for which ρ(xˆ(t + τ)) is a minimum.
Note that ∂xˆ(t+τ)∂x(t) is well defined by Theorem 6.1 of [41] and
noting that ˙ˆx is continuously differentiable. We start with the
following:
lim
k→∞
h(x(t) + νk)− h(x(t))
‖νk‖
= lim
k→∞
inf
τ∈[0,∞)
ρ((xˆ+ δxk)(t+ τ))− inf
τ∈[0,∞)
ρ(xˆ(t+ τ1))
‖νk‖ .
(26)
We claim that as k approaches ∞,
ρ(xˆ(t+ τ1)) +
∂ρ(xˆ(t+ τ1))
∂xˆ(t+ τ1)
∂xˆ(t+ τ1)
∂x(t)
νk
= inf
τ∈[0,∞)
ρ((xˆ+ δxk)(t+ τ)). (27)
Suppose not and let τ2,k ≥ 0 be a time for which ρ((xˆ +
δxk)(t+ τ)) is a minimum. As a first case, suppose ρ(xˆ(t+
τ1)) +
∂ρ(xˆ(t+τ1))
∂xˆ(t+τ1)
∂xˆ(t+τ1)
∂x(t) νk > ρ((xˆ+ δxk)(t+ τ2,k)) +α for
some α > 0. Then for large enough k,
ρ(xˆ(t+ τ1)) +
∂ρ(xˆ(t+ τ1))
∂xˆ(t+ τ1)
∂xˆ(t+ τ1)
∂x(t)
νk
> ρ((xˆ+ δxk)(t+ τ2,k) + α
≥ ρ(xˆ(t+ τ2,k)) + ∂ρ(xˆ(t+ τ2,k))
∂xˆ(t+ τ2,k)
∂xˆ(t+ τ2,k)
∂x(t)
νk + α/2
≥ ρ(xˆ(t+ τ1)) + ∂ρ(xˆ(t+ τ2,k))
∂xˆ(t+ τ2,k)
∂xˆ(t+ τ2,k)
∂x(t)
νk + α/2.
The last inequality holds because τ1 is a time for which ρ(xˆ(t+
τ)) is a minimum so ρ(xˆ(t+τ1)) ≤ ρ(xˆ(t+τ2,k)). Letting k →
∞, we get 0 > α/2, a contradiction. In the other case, suppose
ρ(xˆ(t+τ1))+
∂ρ(xˆ(t+τ1))
∂xˆ(t+τ1)
∂xˆ(t+τ1)
∂x(t) νk < ρ((xˆ+δxk)(t+τ2,k))−
α for some α > 0. Then for large enough k,
ρ((xˆ+ δxk)(t+ τ2,k))− α/2 > ρ((xˆ+ δxk)(t+ τ1))
> ρ((xˆ+ δxk)(t+ τ2,k)).
The second inequality holds because τ2,k is a time for which
ρ((xˆ + δxk)(t + τ) is a minimum. Letting k → ∞, we get
−α/2 > 0, a contradiction. Then (27) holds. From (26) and
(27) we then conclude that
lim
k→∞
h(x(t) + νk)− h(x(t))
‖νk‖ = limk→∞
∂ρ(xˆ(t+τ1))
∂xˆ(t+τ1)
∂xˆ(t+τ1)
∂x(t) νk
‖νk‖ .
(28)
In other words, ∂h(x(t))∂x(t) =
∂ρ(xˆ(t+τ1))
∂xˆ(t+τ1)
∂xˆ(t+τ1)
∂x(t) .
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Fig. 7: Outputs for the scenario with 20 fixed-wing vehicles.
The blue dashed and orange solid lines are the output of the
scenario where h is constructed from γstraight and γturn,
respectively. Vehicle 1 velocity and turn rates are shown to be
within the actuator limits in (a) and (b). Vehicle 1 is plotted as
a representative output since all 20 vehicles cannot be shown
on the same plot. In (c), the minimum distance between any
two vehicles is shown to be above Ds. (d) is the path taken
by vehicle 1. Note that the behavior is significantly different
when constructing h with γturn and γstraight.
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